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THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
AND THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS: 
DONALD TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Milovan Subotić, PhD1 
Strategic Research Institute, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia
Ivan Dimitrijević, MA 
University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies
Abstract: Fight against international terrorism remains one of the keystones of 
the United States’ foreign policy in the upcoming period. The threat of the Islamic 
State is still grave for the international security, so it is understandable that Donald 
Trump administration will remain in this course. In the presentation of the new 
administration’s program at the White House website, it is pointed out that “defeating 
ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups” will be of the highest priority, and that 
joint and coalition efforts will be needed. In the inaugural address, the new President 
stated that the United States intent to “unite the civilized world against Radical Islamic 
Terrorism”. It is initially obvious that, differing from the notion of “fight against violent 
extremism” used by the Obama administration, the new administration talks about 
the fight against radical Islamism. In this paper, the authors will analyze and present 
the key shifts in the United States’ national security policy in the wake of the Donald 
Trump’s administration. Key positions of Trump’s presidential campaign regarding the 
foreign policy, national security policy, fight against the Islamic State, and the reform 
of the Intelligence Community, will be juxtaposed with decisions made during the 
beginning of the presidential term.
Keywords: Intelligence Community, United States, Donald Trump Administration, 
Terrorism, National Security Policy, Islamic State.
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making process for the United States President’s national security policy could 
not be properly fulfilled without effective intelligence, institutionalized within the Intelligence 
Community (IC), if we know that “intelligence as a function of government plays an im-
portant role in the creation and implementation of United States foreign and domestic pol-
icy.”2 If we want to fully understand the importance of well-informed decision-making and/
or policy-making, we need to know the exact role and responsibility of the intelligence in that 
process:
1 Corresponding author. E-mail: milovan.subotic@mod.gov.rs 
2 Stephen Marrin (2014). “The United States”. In: Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia 
Hillebranad (Eds.). Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies. London: Routledge, p. 145.
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“…those who produce intelligence should refrain from formulating policy—that is not 
their job. Instead, intelligence professionals should describe the world around them in the 
most objective way possible, free from political or personal concerns. It is their responsibility 
to ‘tell it like it is’ to the decision-maker. Occasionally, this involves passing along bad news; 
for example, telling a policymaker that his or her plans or policies are not achieving their 
desired ends. This takes a great deal of bravery—no one likes hearing bad news. Given the po-
litical intrigue that is often found in organizations, the IC analyst may be the only individual 
who tells the boss unfortunate news. This is the beauty and the power of the position—good 
decisions can only be made in honest circumstances. To that end, the brave analyst, one who 
is willing to speak the truth, may be the best friend policymakers have, whether they recog-
nize it or not.”3
However, this relation is not a constant one, nor the reliability of the decision-makers 
on the intelligence ‘product’ is permanent. Various administrations had different intelligence 
communities in diverse times, and not all of them had equally reliable and precise intelligence 
in given circumstances. Some presidents relied heavily on their intelligence agencies, some re-
lied more on their cabinet members. Certain decisions were well-informed; some were intui-
tive and based on experience. Some of them entered the White House with prejudice towards 
the world of ‘secret services’, others had intelligence careers before that. “Other factors, from 
presidential neuroses to domestic political interests, are often more powerful.”4 And, final-
ly, there are Presidents who had disputes with intelligence world before entering the White 
House. New American President, Donald Trump, is unique by many standards – he does not 
have a political background, he comes directly from the business world, and he refrains from 
political correctness. Also, during his presidential campaign, Trump had a rather big quarrel 
with the Intelligence Community.
The transition from Donald Trump’s vastly ill-informed and populist presidential cam-
paign rhetoric towards the first presidential systemic obstacles was rather dramatic, and was 
not only related to the matters of domestic policy, but also to the ongoing foreign policy and 
national security issues. The fight against Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) was one of the 
hot topics in the presidential debate, along with the reform of the Intelligence Community in 
the wake of several domestic and international scandals. The role and the significance of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community in the war on terror is of great importance for the fight against 
ISIS as well, especially the defense agencies that make the majority of the Intelligence Com-
munity, and are key operational and tactical intelligence providers in the ongoing Middle East 
situation. Therefore, we will try to explain the relationship between the IC and different Ad-
ministrations in the key periods of the American foreign policy (the Cold War, the post-Cold 
War period, the post-9/11 period), and try to give a general prediction about the new Admin-
istration’s possible paths and directions of the Intelligence Community in the war against ISIS.
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is probably the largest and the most com-
plex national intelligence system in the world, with seven decades of active national security 
and foreign intelligence experience. From 1947, when National Security Act5 was adopted, 
3 Jensen, C.J., McElreath, D.H. & Graves, M. (2013). Introduction to Intelligence Studies. Boca Raton: 
CRC Press, p. 11.
4 Paul R. Pillar (2011). Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. New York: 
Columbia University Press, p. 6.
5 An Act to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military 
Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, a Department of the Air Force; 
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until today, this community was built from scratch into a 17-agency all-source intelligence 
system aimed at both domestic and international (foreign) threats. In brief:
“The U.S. IC is a coalition of 17 agencies and organizations within the executive branch 
that works both independently and collaboratively to gather the intelligence necessary to con-
duct foreign relations and national security activities. The primary mission of the IC is to 
collect and convey the essential information that the president and members of the policy-
making, law enforcement, and military communities require to execute their appointed du-
ties. The 17 agencies possess a wide range of capabilities and intelligence needs themselves.”6
The history of the IC was rather dynamic and turbulent. Key cornerstones of its develop-
ment were related to significant events in American domestic or foreign policy. For instance, 
after the Watergate scandal, the first bigger IC-related legislative reform was made with the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act7 in 1978. This law was aimed at the improvement of in-
telligence collection and analysis, as well as to make a clear distinction between various tasks 
and authorities of then members of the intelligence community (at the time, still not officially 
named the Intelligence Community). The original idea was to make limitations to the IC 
covert or illegal ops, and to implement appropriate measures if these activities were carried 
out in unethical manner. However, in 1981 the Executive Order 12333 on United States In-
telligence Activities8 was signed by President Ronald Reagan, with the aim to “provide for the 
effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional 
rights”9. The Executive Order “clearly delineated the roles and responsibilities of agencies and 
individuals within the intelligence community”10:
“The objective was to ensure that the president and National Security Council received 
necessary and timely information ‘on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and 
development of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of the United States 
national interests from foreign security threats.’ To achieve this goal, Executive Order 12333 
promoted analytical competition in the Intelligence Community and directed it to use all 
means “consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consider-
ation of the rights of United States persons” to detect and counter espionage, terrorism, and 
other threats.”11
The main contribution of the Executive Order 12333 to the reform of the Intelligence 
Community was precise definition of the roles of the IC members, and for the first time insti-
tutionalized it under the name of the Intelligence Community:
 - “Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other executive branch officials for the 
performance of their duties and responsibilities;
 - Production and dissemination of intelligence;
and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments 
and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security. Congress of the United States of 
America, 61 STAT. 495.
6 Jensen, C.J., McElreath, D.H. & Graves, M. (2013). Introduction to Intelligence Studies. Boca Raton: 
CRC Press, p. 12.
7 An Act to Authorize Electronic Surveillance to Obtain Foreign Intelligence Information. Congress of the 
United States of America, 92 STAT. 1783.
8 Executive Order No. 12,333 – United States Intelligence Activities, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981 Comp.).
9 William F. Brown, Americo R. Cinquegrana (1985). Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign 
Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment. Catholic University Law 
Review, 35(1), 97-179.
10 Cully Stimson (January 24, 2017). Will Trump Reform the Intelligence Community? History Offers 
Some Clues. The Daily Signal, Available through: http://dailysignal.com/2017/01/24/will-trump-reform-
the-intelligence-community-history-offers-some-clues/ (accessed March 10th, 2017).
11 Ibid.
Milovan Subotić, Ivan Dimitrijević290
 - Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, 
intelligence activities directed against the U.S., international terrorist and/or narcotics 
activities, and other hostile activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, organizations, 
persons and their agents;
 - Special activities (defined as activities conducted in support of U.S. foreign policy 
objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the “role of the United States 
Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly”, and functions in support of such 
activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public 
opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and 
production of intelligence or related support functions);
 - Administrative and support activities within the United States and abroad necessary for 
the performance of authorized activities and
 - Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.”12
Through the Executive Order, Reagan “not only made the intelligence community more 
responsive to oversight by elected officials, he also gave each agency clear responsibilities and 
goals. This empowered the intelligence community to work effectively to generate information 
necessary to make important policy and national security decisions.”13 The Order was used by 
the presidents for the past three and a half decades, and “has enabled every president to provide 
clear direction to the intelligence community regarding its organization and objectives.”14
After 9/11, the American national security policy was dramatically changed and focused 
on protection of the U.S. national interests both at home and abroad, with all the available 
means. The reform of the Intelligence Community was imminent, primarily because of the 
large disappointment with one of the biggest intelligence failures in American history. The 
key document for the beginning of the new and comprehensive intelligence reform was a 9/11 
Commission Report15, which concluded “that the intelligence community needed significant 
changes to its organizational structure to better control and coordinate the complex web of 
intelligence agencies.”16 Thus, “the first major legislative reform of the intelligence community 
came in 2004 when President George W. Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terror-
ism Prevention Act (IRTPA) into law.”17 This Act established the position of the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI), who is appointed by the President, but not a member of his 
Executive Office. However, the DNI is “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 
President” to:
−	 “serve as a head of the Intelligence Community,
−	 act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and 
the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security, and
−	 oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.”18
12 Ibid, Executive Order No. 12,333.
13 Ibid, Will Trump Reform the Intelligence Community?
14 Ibid.
15 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 
Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the 
signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, was chartered to prepare a full and complete account 
of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and 
the immediate response to the attacks. The Commission was also mandated to provide recommendations 
designed to guard against future attacks. More through: https://9-11commission.gov/report/ 
16 Cully Stimson (January 24, 2017). Will Trump Reform the Intelligence Community? History Offers 
Some Clues. The Daily Signal, Available through: http://dailysignal.com/2017/01/24/will-trump-reform-
the-intelligence-community-history-offers-some-clues/ (accessed March 10th, 2017).
17 Ibid.
18 An Act to Reform the Intelligence Community and the Intelligence and Intelligence-related Activities of 
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Because “intelligence requirements for counterterrorism span a matrix of strategic, 
operational and tactical analytical levels, and offensive and defensive measures and actions”19, 
one of the major changes introduced by the IRTPA was the codification of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), previously established by Presidential Executive Order 
13354.20 The idea behind the NCTC was to make a center for joint operational planning 
and intelligence, which will include officers from different agencies, notably members 
of the Intelligence Community. The Director of the NCTC reports both the President for 
counterterrorism planning line of responsibility, and the Director of National Intelligence 
for intelligence issues. He also has the duty to follow national security policy framework and 
directions from the President, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council.
Figure 1. The United States Intelligence Community, Agencies reporting to DNI21
Apart from the War on Terror and fight against Al Qaeda in the 9/11 aftermath, the In-
telligence Community did not have much of a success on the other fields, and also suffered 
some major failures, that raised high-level alert in the public about human and privacy rights 
abuse. First, the fact that the uprising in the Arab countries from 2010 to 2012 appeared com-
pletely under the IC radar is one of the setbacks of the intelligence reform, along with several 
the United States Government, and for other Purposes. Congress of the United States of America, S. 2845.
19 Neal A. Pollard & Lt John P. Sullivan (2014). Counterterrorism and Intelligence. In: Robert Dover, 
Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebranad (Eds.). Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies. 
London: Routledge, p. 247.
20 Executive Order No. 13,354 – National Counterterrorism Center, 3 C.F.R. (2004).
21 Carl J. Jensen, David H. McElreath, & Melissa Graves (2013). Introduction to Intelligence Studies. Boca 
Raton: CRC Press, p. 56.
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terrorist attacks on American soil. Scandals with diplomatic cables leak (Wiki Leaks) and 
Edward Snowden revelations about National Security Agency’s massive abuse of information 
and communication technology infrastructure in the U.S. and abroad raised even more ques-
tions about the responsibility of the Intelligence Community.
If we consider the stand of Stephen Marrin, that strategic intelligence “has limited in-
fluence on American foreign policy”22, and that the main reasons for that are “due to the 
combination of political commitments and cognitive biases at the highest levels of national 
policy-making which hinder or otherwise prevent intelligence analysis from influencing poli-
cy”23, we could consider Donald Trump’s relation to the Intelligence Community as extremely 
biased and problematic, but not completely without reason. During the campaign, Trump 
had several very serious allegations towards some Intelligence Community agencies, which 
started in October 2016, after the Department of Homeland Security and the ODNI made 
the statement on Russian involvement in the election process. On multiple occasions from 
October 2016 to January 2017, Donald Trump commented the allegations by claiming there 
are direct linkage between the Democratic National Committee and the Intelligence Com-
munity, that some agencies purposely leaked false information to the media, and that the 
masterminds behind the allegations are the same agencies responsible for 2003 intelligence 
failure over Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction.24 However, on the first day of Donald Trump’s 
presidency, he visited the Central Intelligence Agency and sent a message that the media ex-
aggerated about his relation to the Intelligence Community, which could be considered as a 
good sign of their future relationship.
THE U.S. AND THE FIGHT AGAINST 
THE ISLAMIC STATE
After the beginning of the Iraqi Civil War in 2014, it was obvious that the new security 
actor, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Islamic State, or ISIS) is gaining more territo-
rial control than expected, and after spreading into eastern parts of Syria, it was clear that its 
conflict potential is far from controllable, especially when we know today that “the Islamic 
state has grown into a significant stakeholder in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq”25. From sum-
mer 2014, the United States entered the conflict with small troops in Iraq, which was followed 
with air strikes in Iraq and Syria from August, and making of the U.S.-led coalition of fourteen 
countries fighting ISIS. In two and a half years the number of actors, besides the coalition, 
involved Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and United Arab Emirates. The situation on the 
field dramatically changed in 2016, when key towns were liberated, and ISIS lost the majority 
of territory occupied, especially in Iraq and Syria.
Donald Trump’s relation towards the fight against ISIS has shifted since his Presidential 
Announcement in June 2015. Because ISIS was one of the hot topics during the presidential 
campaign, Trump has had numerous statements on possible American involvement during 
his term. First he stated that Syria should be “a free zone for ISIS, let them fight and then you 
22 Stephen Marrin (2017). Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis has Limited Influence on American 
Foreign Policy. Intelligence and National Security, DOI:10.1080/02684527.2016.1275139.
23 Ibid, p. 2.
24 Eugene Kiely (January 23rd, 2017). Trump and Intelligence Community. FactCheck, Available through: 
http://www.factcheck.org/2017/01/trump-and-intelligence-community/ (Accessed March 26th, 2017).
25 Miroslav Talijan, Hatidža Beriša, Rade Slavković (2016). The Battle against Islamic State: Some of the 
Possible Strategies. International Scientific Conference „Archibald Reiss Days“ Proceedings, vol. 2, p. 
338.
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pick the remnants”26, and after that he supported the Russian military intervention in Syria. In 
2016 Trump changed his rhetoric with focusing on the US military capacities for combating 
ISIS. First he proposed sending 20-30 thousand troops, but soon withdrew that statement, 
and then proposed the use of NATO and neighboring states (in the Middle East) in ousting 
ISIS from the region. In many of his speeches, the fight against ISIS was connected with the 
fight against the “radical Islamic terrorism”.
In the presentation of the new administration’s program at the White House website, it is 
pointed out that “defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups” will be of the highest 
priority, and that joint and coalition efforts will be needed. In the inaugural address, the new 
President stated that the United States intent to “unite the civilized world against Radical 
Islamic Terrorism”. It is initially obvious that, differing from the notion of “fight against vio-
lent extremism” used by the Obama administration, the new administration talks about the 
fight against radical Islamism. However, relation towards rhetoric on radical Islamic terrorism 
changed after Trump began staffing the new Cabinet and Executive Office. New National Se-
curity Advisor, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, already gave his stand regarding the fight against the 
radical Islamic groups. In February 2017, he stated that the label of “radical Islamic terrorism” 
was not helpful as the perpetrators were “un-Islamic”, which is regarded as a “break from 
the rhetoric” of Trump’s presidential statements.27 Something closer to the stand of Obama’s 
administration, which is also encouraging in terms of shifting the discourse from presidential 
campaign towards more realistic approach. Fight against international terrorism remains one 
of the keystones of the United States’ foreign policy in the upcoming period. The threat of the 
Islamic State is still grave for the international security, so it is understandable that Donald 
Trump administration will remain in this course.
CONCLUSIONS
Donald Trump’s “reality check”, apart from realizing that the division of power in the Unit-
ed States is still a keystone of the American political system, is also visible in his relation to 
the Intelligence Community and very sensitive question of the future course of American 
national security policy. First, he realized that the IC is very complex and sensitive legislative 
and institutional framework and a backbone of the United States counterterrorism strategy. 
The U.S. involvement in the fight against ISIS during the previous administration could not 
be implemented without the strong IC. Also, new administration should carefully cooperate 
with the Intelligence Community, where the position of the Director of National Intelligence 
is probably the key one. “The Director of National Intelligence would be the key player for 
implementing any intelligence community reforms dealing with security clearance, intelli-
gence acquisition, and information sharing.”28 Also, President Trump is going to have “a lot 
of executive discretion as president on how to use the intelligence community, starting with 
his Director of National Intelligence, former Republican Senator Dan Coats. As a highly suc-
cessful businessman, Trump will quickly learn that the director’s office works best with a very 
26 Donald Trump running for President (Interview) (June 17, 2015). FOX News, Available through: 
http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2015/06/17/donald-trump-running-for-president.html (accessed 
March 10th, 2017).
27 Rebecca Flood (February 25th, 2017). Donald Trump and his New National Security Advisor Look 
Set to Clash on Radical Islam. Independent, Available through: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/donald-trump-national-security-advisor-clash-islam-radical-mcmaster-a7599641.
html (Accessed March 25th, 2017).
28 Cully Stimson (January 24, 2017).Will Trump Reform the Intelligence Community? History Offers Some 
Clues. The Daily Signal, Available through: http://dailysignal.com/2017/01/24/will-trump-reform-the-
intelligence-community-history-offers-some-clues/ (accessed March 10th, 2017).
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small but highly competent staff that promotes integration and collaboration among the 17 
intelligence agencies under its charge and does not conduct operational activities itself.”29 As 
soon as he becomes well- informed by the closest Cabinet members about the national se-
curity priorities, capabilities and strategic and legal framework, the “big picture” will start to 
appear. Bearing in mind that the threat posed by ISIS is still on, this should be done as soon 
as possible, if new administration plans to maintain and/or improve the national and interna-
tional security on the high level.
What are the challenges before the new administration? In the Intelligence Community 
arena, there are two possible obstacles. Firstly, “the director of national intelligence can fos-
ter collaboration and cooperation between intelligence agencies, but has limited authority to 
direct...”, which means that “...there is no central position that can enforce change throughout 
the intelligence community.”30 Apart from that, there is a problem with different organiza-
tional structures of the 16 agencies, which are tailored for each of the agency’s mission, so the 
biggest challenge will be to “create an analytical and communications structure that would 
also make the intelligence community more effective as a whole.”31 In the fight against ISIS, 
Feaver and Brands32 give four different possibilities for Donald Trump:
“As president, he faces a broad range of choices. At one extreme, Washington could aban-
don its military commitments in the greater Middle East on the assumption that it is U.S. in-
terference that provokes terrorism in the first place. At the other, it could adopt a heavy-foot-
print surge strategy that would involve using overwhelming military force to destroy globally 
capable terrorist organizations and attempt to politically transform the societies that produce 
them. In between lie two options: one, a light-footprint approach akin to that taken by the 
Obama administration before ISIS’ rise; the other, a more robust approach closer to Washing-
ton’s response to ISIS since late 2014.”33
If we rely strictly on Donald Trump’s discourse shift both in his statements regarding the 
Intelligence Community and fight against ISIS, we could draw a conclusion that there is a 
sort of mindset change caused by taking the seat in the White House. Maybe there was even a 
bigger reliance on his immediate personnel, especially advisory team, regarding the national 
security policy. That is certainly an encouraging picture, especially after a first impression 
that Trump publicly had before inauguration. But, one has to consider that there have always 
been cyclical relationships between the presidents and the intelligence communities, and that 
today’s misunderstandings and quarrels could become a matter of history as soon as the cir-
cumstances change. One of the possible solutions for ending this distrust could be swift and 
clean ending of the ongoing fight against the Islamic State, something that has already begun, 
which could open space for further leveling of differences that exist between the President 
and the Intelligence Community.
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